This paper studies decentralized vote trading in a power-sharing system that follows the rules of strategic market games. In particular, we study a two-party election, in which prior to the voting stage voters are free to trade votes for money. Voters hold private information about both their ordinal and cardinal preferences, whereas their utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party. In this framework we prove generic existence of a unique full trade equilibrium (an equilibrium in which nobody refrains from vote trading). We moreover argue that vote trading in such systems unambiguously improves voters'welfare.
Introduction
Despite many critiques on ethical and philosophical grounds, vote markets have been a research issue for economists for quite a long time, because they re ‡ect voters'intensity of preferences over policies in the same way that regular markets re ‡ect consumers' preferences over commodities. However, vote-trading models are not immune to criticism on economics' grounds as well, because of votes'distinct characteristics when compared to other commodities. 1 For example, vote trading embodies externalities on third parties and in many occasions leads to undesirable welfare results. Furthermore, in many settings the existence of equilibrium faces serious problems that have prevented the wide adoption of a general model of decentralized vote trading. This paper contributes to the literature on vote markets by departing from standard approaches in a dual manner; …rst, by analyzing the market for votes in a power-sharing system (instead of the majoritarian framework) and second, by introducing to a decentralized vote-trading model the rules of strategic market games.
The …rst distinctive feature of our analysis is that decision-making power is not attributed as a whole to the plurality winner, but is distributed among competing parties in a proportional manner. In other words, a voter's utility is proportionally increasing in the vote share of her favorite party and hence she should prefer that this party receives as many votes as possible.
Similar frameworks have been employed to analyze a variety of issues in political economics
literature 2 and provide us with all the necessary tools to avoid the de…ciencies associated with simple plurality rule. In particular, our model does not involve severe discontinuities in voters' utilities and hence, at the right price, there is always demand for any single vote o¤ered in exchange for money. Moreover, our analysis is relevant to many modern democratic societies in which policy outcomes are not determined by the plurality winner but instead are shaped by all competing parties. Indeed, several parliamentary systems are characterized by grand coalition governments and proportional electoral rules (Switzerland, Belgium and Denmark are only a few examples of countries that are governed in this manner). In such power-sharing 3 1 See, for instance, Ferejohn (1974) , Philipson and Snyder (1996) , Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey (2012) for a review of the issue. 2 See, for instance, Lijphart (1984) , Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Ortuño-Ortín (1997), Grossman and Helpman (1999) , Baron and Diermeier (2001) , Morelli (2004) , Llavador (2006) , Sahuguet and Persico (2006) , Merrill and Adams (2007) , De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2007), Herrera, Morelli, and Palfrey, (2014), Saporiti (2014) , Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013) and Matakos, Troumpounis, and Xefteris (2015) among others. 3 The term is due to Lijphart (1984) and describes systems such that no group is left out of decision making settings, all parties have signi…cant role in decision making, with the higher the number of votes that a party receives the more in ‡uence it has on the implemented policy. 4 Hence, the whole distribution of votes is crucial for the determination of policies. Given the signi…cant extent to which power-sharing procedures are used, we believe that it is imperative to study how vote trading operates under such conditions. In addition, given the debate about the ideal governance system, 5 where both types of democracy (power-sharing and majoritarian) have been contested in terms of their applicability and performance, our paper adds a new aspect (the e¢ ciency of vote trading) into the discussion.
Our approach also employs alternative methodological tools, as vote trading is modeled as a strategic market game. Strategic market games are a class of non-cooperative games that are characterized by an explicit market mechanism, which maps individuals'actions to trades and prices (see, for example, Shapley and Shubik, 1977; Peck, Shell, and Spear, 1992) . Hence, our approach, instead of assuming price-taking behavior with all its resultant inadequacies, allows individuals to strategically trade votes for money, with their market actions having a clear impact on prices. Given the variety of issues in political economics in which vote trading has been used for, we believe that the development of a strategic version of the trading process is very important as it helps us to evaluate which of the conclusions of the literature, if any, carry over to non-competitive markets. Moreover, the rules of these games allow us to study vote trading using a conventional solution concept (Bayesian Nash equilibrium) that is more familiar to voting literature. 6 Earlier papers on decentralized vote trading (Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey, 2012; Casella, Palfrey, and Turban, 2014; Casella and Turban, 2014) employed a price-taking approach and, hence had to adopt solution concepts that associate with such a framework (for example, ex ante competitive equilibrium in Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey, 2012).
Combining the above features we study a game, in which prior to the voting stage voters (grand coalitions) and the power of each group is equal to its size (proportional electoral rule). 4 In fact, following Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013) , the implemented policy may be simply interpreted as the result of a probabilistic compromise between the competing alternatives, with the probability of implementation of each policy alternative being equal to its vote share. 5 A debate that started with the seminal work of Lijphart (1968) , who is the primary advocate of the superiority of power-sharing regimes over majoritarian ones. 6 The use of game-theoretic tools also associates our analysis with the literature of vote buying through centralized bargaining (e.g., Baron and Ferejohn, 1989 ) and decentralized bargaining (e.g., Iaryczower and Oliveros, 2016) . are free to trade votes for money. We assume that voters are heterogeneous not just in terms of ordinal preferences but also as far as cardinal preferences are concerned and that a voter's preferences (both ordinal and cardinal) are her private information. We moreover consider that if a voter decides to sell her vote she has to sell it as a whole, and that if a voter decides to buy votes she has to bid a predetermined amount of money -which we …x to one dollar without loss of generality. These assumptions, combined with the market mechanism of strategic market games, suggest that the price of a vote is equal to the ratio of the number of vote buyers over the number of vote sellers. Of course, since voters'preferences are private information at the vote-trading stage and all players have to decide simultaneously whether to buy, sell or do nothing it is straightforward that when they make their choices they are uncertain regarding Our results give explicit answers to these questions. Initially, we establish in Proposition 1 that vote trading occurs in every almost strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 7 In each such equilibrium, voters who are relatively indi¤erent between the two parties o¤er their votes in exchange for money, whereas voters who have relatively more asymmetric valuations of the parties o¤er their money in exchange for votes. Next we demonstrate that there is a unique full trade equilibrium, that is an equilibrium in which all individuals engage in vote trading (i.e., no single voter prefers to abstain from it). Indeed, Proposition 2 de…nes for this equilibrium the unique preference intensity parameter that groups individuals into vote sellers and vote buyers. Finally, given that vote trading is preferred to the just cast your vote alternative by all individuals, we show in Proposition 3 that allowing for vote trading unambiguously improves social welfare. Therefore, it should receive law-makers'attention. 7 A Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which almost all players'types strictly prefer their equilibrium strategy to any other. of each group demands votes, with the minority's voter being more aggressive. As a result, the minority's favorite policy is implemented with higher probability than the e¢ cient level, which suggests that vote trading can be welfare inferior to simple plurality rule without vote trading.
The strong di¤erences though between the present and earlier approaches to decentralized vote trading should come at no surprise because: a) the transition from price-taking to strategic behavior has non-trivial implications on equilibrium outcomes in most trade environments and b) power-sharing systems involve a completely distinct set of strategic incentives as far as voters' behavior is concerned compared to simple plurality rule. In order to fully apprehend the source of these di¤erences, one should also have an idea how plurality performs in our votetrading environment. For that purpose, in the last part of the paper we explore features of the equilibrium outcomes under plurality rule. As a complement to our results, we demonstrate that a full trade equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist in majoritarian settings, whereas the welfare results are no longer unambiguous as in our original approach (in fact, vote trading could be welfare reducing).
We proceed to develop the model in Section 2. Next we present the results in Section 3. The di¤erences with plurality rule follow in Section 4. In Section 5 we summarize our conclusions and we discuss some possible extensions.
The model
We consider a society Q = f1; 2; :::; ng of n > 2 voters and two …xed alternatives, A and B. after the election is given by In our framework, votes are perfectly divisible and, hence, a player might end up having a non-integer number of votes. Notice that we study a model of power sharing -all that matters is the share of votes that each alternative receives -and hence voting is merely an attribution 9 Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey (2012) …nd that vote trading has negative impact on voters'welfare, and this result in derived in a symmetric environment like the present paper. 10 Requiring that all purchasing bids are of the same monetary amount is made to ensure tractability of our equilibrium analysis: allowing di¤erent players bid di¤erent amounts would make the analytical computation of expected utilities implausible. Notice though that this assumption does not interfere in any way with the main distinctive feature of vote markets compared to markets for standard goods (the utility of non-traders in vote markets is a¤ected by traders'decisions, whereas no such externalities arise in standard markets). In our framework it is clear that the expected vote share of a non-trader's preferred party -and subsequently her utility -depends, on the relationship between type A and type B sellers/buyers and hence the vote market distinctiveness is preserved intact. of additional weight to one's preferred alternative. That is, there is no reason at all why these weights cannot be non-integers. What we should stress though is that the above is strictly conditional on both B and S being non-empty. When at least one of these sets is empty then no trade takes place and all players keep their money and their vote.
Since the behavior of players who can vote (the ones who haven't sold their votes) is completely unambiguous -attributing all votes that one has to her preferred alternative is a dominant strategy -we essentially have an one-shot game and, hence we de…ne an equilibrium only in terms of players'strategies and beliefs in the vote-trading stage of the game. The obvious solution concept for such one-shot games of private information with a continuum of types is Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) in pure strategies. We will focus on almost strict BNE in pure strategies, that is on equilibria such that a measure one of players'types strictly prefer their equilibrium strategy to any other. Moreover, given the symmetry assumption, we focus on equilibria in which players of the same preference intensity choose the same vote-trading strategy (irrespective of whether they prefer alternative A or B). Hence, when we use the term equilibrium we refer to this particular subset of BNE.
Results
We directly proceed to the statement of the formal results of the paper. )w i + 1 while when choosing b it is given by
where
We notice that
(n k 1) n and hence we get that
which, by applying the Binomial theorem, can be shown 11 to be equivalent to
Standard algebraic manipulations yield that for every w i >ŵ = 2n((1 zs) n +zs 1) (n 1)(zs 1)zs (which is strictly positive for any n > 1 and z s > 0) 12 it is the case that
Obviously, the measure of types for which w i >ŵ is equal to 1 F (ŵ) and it is hence non- an almost strict BNE. These prove that in every almost strict BNE it must be the case that trade occurs with positive probability.
The above proposition establishes that vote trading takes place in every equilibrium; it does not guarantee that an equilibrium actually exists. The next proposition does that by proving existence of a unique full trade equilibrium for every possible parameter values. In a full trade 11 Notice that
2n . 12 For z s ! 1 we have thatŵ ! 2n n 1 > 0: equilibrium almost no one refrains from vote trading (a measure one of players'types choose either to sell or to buy votes) and hence only players who decided to buy votes actually get to vote. This means that each of these voters carries as many votes as any other and thus the vote-trading game that we analyze essentially leads to a pay-to-vote mechanism: players who pay one dollar get the right to vote and players who do not pay to vote get an equal share of the amount gathered by those who paid to vote.
Proposition 2 For any admissible F there exists a unique full trade equilibrium and it is
such that all players with intensity parameters smaller than w 000 sell their votes and all players with intensity parameters larger than w 000 buy votes, where w 000 is uniquely de…ned by 2n([1
Proof.
Step 1 We …rst argue that in every almost strict BNE there exists: a) w 0 such that all players with w i < w 0 are better o¤ choosing s than y and all players with w i > w 0 are better o¤ choosing y than s and b) w 00 such that all players with w i > w 00 are better o¤ choosing b than y and all players with w i < w 00 are better o¤ choosing y than b.
Since in every almost strict BNE trade occurs with positive probability it follows that a measure z s > 0 of types choose s and a measure z b > 0 of types choose b. If this is the case, then the expected utility of a player i 2 Q with intensity parameter w i when choosing s is given by
when choosing b it is given by
while when choosing y it is given by Eu i (y) = ( ) we have that all players with w i < w 00 = 1=[E(v J i j x i = b and #S > 0) (
)] are better o¤ choosing y than b and all players with w i > w 00 are better o¤ choosing b than y.
Step 2 In a full trade almost strict BNE it must be the case that 0 < w 00 w 0 and hence that z s = F (w 000 ) = 1 z b where w 000 > 0 is the solution of Eu i (s) = Eu i (b). This is so because if we had 0 < w 0 < w 00 then a set of types of positive measure F (w 00 ) F (w 0 ) > 0 would prefer action y over b and over s.
Assume that such an equilibrium exists. Then all players with w i > w 000 choose b and that all players with w i < w 000 choose s. If the posited behavior is an equilibrium then no player should have incentives to deviate. In this case we have that
The above help us write the expected utilities in a much more convenient form. 13 That is,
and
We observe that: a)
. These show that in a full trade almost strict BNE it must be the case 13 Notice that
and, by applying the Binomial theorem, we get
. Similarly, it can be shown that P n 2 k=0 [(
. So if we show the existence of a unique
, we essentially establish both existence and uniqueness of a full trade almost strict BNE.
We de…ne R(x) = 2n((1 x) n +x 1)
x n x and observe that: a) lim x!0 R(x) = 2n(n 1) > 0, b) lim x!1 R(x) = 2n=(n 1) 2 (0; lim x!0 R(x)) and @R(x) @x < 0 for every x 2 (0; 1). That is,
, which may be rewritten as 2n([1 F (w 000 )] n 1) = w 000 F (w 000 ) n (2n + w 000 )F (w 000 ), is guaranteed to have a unique solution for every admissible F and hence the game admits a unique full trade almost strict BNE.
As far as comparative statics of this equilibrium are concerned we notice that the threshold value w 000 is "roughly" increasing in n. By "roughly" increasing we mean that w 000 becomes arbitrarily large when n takes arbitrarily large values, whereas for small values of n their relationship need not be monotonic. This is illustrated in Figure 1 , where we plot w 000 for various values of n considering that: a) F is a log-normal distribution with parameters zero and one (that is, with mean e 1=2 and variance (e 1)e); and b) F is Pareto distribution with scale parameter one, shape parameter one and an adjusted support [0; +1] to coincide with our model's assumptions.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Observe that as the population becomes arbitrarily large it must be the case that the intensity threshold must become arbitrarily large too. If the equilibrium threshold is below some w max > 0 for every n 2 R, then, in expected terms, the vote buyers should represent a share of the total population at least as large as 1 F (w max ). If vote buyers represent such a non-degenerate measure, it should be the case that their expected absolute number should converge to in…nity when n ! +1 and, hence, the e¤ect of individual vote buying on parties' expected vote shares should become in…nitesimal. That is, for n su¢ ciently large, if at least a share 1 F (w max ) of players buy votes (and at most a share F (w max ) of players sell votes), a player with parameter equal to w i > w max should strictly prefer to sell her vote rather than buy.
This contradicts the assumption that the threshold is below some w max > 0 for every n 2 R and suggests that the equilibrium threshold should be increasing in n, at least for relatively large values of n.
To see how the threshold changes with n, when n is small, let us turn attention to the exact e¤ects of adding a player in the game. Assume that, initially, there are n players and that we are in equilibrium: all players with intensity parameter smaller than w n sell and all players with intensity parameter larger than w n buy. If we keep the threshold constant and we add a new player (that is, if we add a player but consider that each of these n + 1 players sells if her intensity is smaller than w n and buys otherwise), the following force arises: the expected e¤ect of individual vote buying on parties'expected vote shares decreases as there exist, in expected terms, more vote buyers. This makes vote buying less appealing and pushes the threshold to increase. If the threshold increases then a new force appears: the expected price of each vote decreases as more people are expected to sell. This makes vote selling less appealing and pushes the threshold to decrease. In other words, there are opposite forces from adding a new player on the equilibrium threshold and depending on the model's exact parametrization (that is, depending on F and the initial value of n) we might have an increase or a decrease of the threshold value.
We …nally argue in the following proposition that in any equilibrium of this game players' welfare is unambiguously larger compared to the no-trade scenario. This holds both in social and in individual terms and most importantly it is true both under the veil of ignorance and when players are fully aware of their preferences. The intuition why allowing for vote trading in the framework of a power-sharing system unambiguously improves welfare lies in the fact that the no-trade action delivers to an individual the same expected utility for all possible equilibrium beliefs. Hence, a player that neither sells nor buys votes expects the same utility both when vote trading is allowed (that is, when some players might be expected to engage in it) and when vote trading is not allowed (that is, when nobody is expected to engage in vote trading).
Proposition 3 All (a positive measure of) players'types expect weakly (strictly) larger utility in every equilibrium of this game compared to when vote trading is not allowed.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. We know that the expected utility of a player i 2 Q with intensity parameter w i when choosing y is given by Eu i (y) = (
)w i + 1. We notice that this is independent of the exact share of vote buyers over vote sellers. Hence, this should be the expected utility of this player even when nobody is expected to trade and thus in the variation of the game in which trade is not allowed. By Proposition 1 we know that in every almost strict BNE it has to be the case that a positive measure of types trades and by Proposition 2 we know that an almost strict BNE actually exists. Therefore, in every almost strict BNE it is the case that a positive measure of players'types expect strictly larger utility than Eu i (y) and no player expects lower utility than Eu i (y).
This establishes that once a voter knows her preferences and given the equilibrium expectations regarding what other players will do, she is better o¤ (all players'types weakly and a positive measure of them strictly) when vote trading is allowed compared to when it is not. Finally, let us comment on the robustness of our welfare results with respect to more general bidding frameworks (that is, when di¤erent players may bid di¤erent monetary amounts). It is perfectly possible to formally argue that our positive welfare results directly extend to such a general case, despite the fact that a full characterization of an equilibrium is not plausible.
Indeed, given the symmetric structure of the voters' blocks 14 and the employed equilibrium notion, players'strategies in equilibrium should depend only on their cardinal preferences and hence the expected utility of a non-trader is Eu i (y) = (
)w i + 1 independently of the exact bid of each buyer. That is, in every equilibrium, the no-trade action makes a player at least as happy as in the case in which trade is not allowed and hence everybody is weakly better o¤ when vote trading is allowed.
Comparison with plurality rule
In this part of the paper we discuss the e¤ects of substituting the power-sharing institutions with majoritarian ones in our vote-trading environment. This is crucial as it will help us clarify and disentangle the e¤ects of the two main elements of our analysis (power-sharing institutions and norms of strategic market games) on our formal results (generic existence of a welfare improving full trade equilibrium). Voters are characterized by the ordinal/cardinal preferences and beliefs that were described earlier, there are no changes in terms of the trading rules and the only di¤erence concerns the adoption of plurality decision rule.
In this setting we denote by h(m; p; x) the probability mass function of a binomial distribution with parameters m (number of trials) and p (probability of success) at x. That is, h(m; p; x) is the probability of x successes out of n trials when the success probability of each trial is equal to p. When m is even (E) and p = , the probability that, out of m trials, the number of successes is at least , the probability that, out of m trials, the number of successes is at least 
; x).
Considering that n is odd, we assume that a full trade equilibrium exists and it is such that all players with intensity parameters smaller than v sell their votes and all players with intensity parameters larger than v buy votes. Then, the expected utility of individual i from choosing s is given by:
The …rst part of this expression corresponds to the cases in which vote trading takes place.
For vote trading to occur in this case it is necessary that at least one player chooses to buy.
Notice that k = 0 corresponds to the case that zero other players sell (that is, all other voters buy) and k = n 2 corresponds to the case that n 2 other players sell (that is, only one player buys). The second term of the expression corresponds to the eventuality that vote trading does not occur (that is, when all the n 1 other players decide to sell too).
The expected utility of individual i from choosing b is given by:
The …rst sum of this expression corresponds to the cases in which the number of vote buyers, excluding player i, is an even number and vote trading takes place (that is, there is at least one player that sells her vote). Hence, the number of vote buyers, except player i, is even and ranges from zero to n 3. Similarly, the second sum corresponds to the cases in which the number of vote buyers, excluding player i, is an odd number and vote trading takes place. The last part of the expression corresponds to the eventuality that vote trading does not occur (that is, when all the n 1 other players decide to buy too).
Finally, the expected utility of individual i from choosing y is given by:
The …rst sum of this expression corresponds to the cases in which the number of players who chose b is an even positive number. If k 2 f1; :::; . We consider that F = ln N (0; 1) and two distinct population sizes; n = 7 and n = 9. When n = 7 (in this case v 3:685) we …nd that: a) indeed, a full trade equilibrium exists, but b) some players' types (those that are relatively indi¤erent between b and s) expect strictly lower utility in this equilibrium compared to when vote trading is not allowed. Moreover, when n = 9 (in this case v 3:7) a full trade equilibrium does not exist since those that are relatively indi¤erent between b and s, strictly prefer y to both of these actions. All these …ndings are presented on Figure 2 .
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Hence, existence of a full trade equilibrium is not generic under plurality rule and, even when such an equilibrium exists, it does not guarantee unambiguously larger expected payo¤s to almost all players compared to when vote trading is not allowed. These observations show that the general …ndings of our main analysis (generic existence of a unique welfare improving full trade equilibrium), are not solely due to the strategic market approach that we employed, but they closely relate to the power-sharing institutions that we consider.
Concluding remarks
This paper studies a simple power-sharing environment with strategic players in an attempt to overcome some shortcomings of existing models of decentralized vote trading. For instance, our approach does not feature the discontinuities in payo¤s associated with plurality rule and allows prices to be determined by the actions of all vote traders. Above all, we provide clearcut results about the existence of equilibrium involving trade. Moreover, unlike most …ndings in the literature, our equilibrium outcomes allow for the dispersion of votes to many buyers and provide positive welfare results as we exhibit that vote trading makes voters better o¤.
Therefore, the superiority of vote trading compared to the no-trade option is easily justi…ed.
We believe that our approach o¤ers interesting insights into decentralized vote trading; yet there are still many central questions in the literature, so we hope that our attempt will pave the way for new studies. An interesting way to go forward would possibly be to extend our model to multiple issues. Vote markets in such environments allow individuals to buy (sell) votes on issues they care the most (less) and the strategic market game mechanism will allow prices to re ‡ect the di¤erences in the intensities of preferences. Finally, given that experimental strategic market games have already been implemented (e.g., Huber, Shubik, and Sunder, 2010;
Du¤y, Matros, and Temzelides, 2011), we believe that it is challenging for future research to 
